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Post 9-11 U.S. Muslim Labor Market Outcomes
* 
 
Using a difference-in-differences framework and micro data from the Current Population 
Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Group Files (1999 to 2004), this paper estimates the 
impact that the 9-11 terrorists attacks had on the U.S. labor market outcomes of individuals 
with nativity profiles similar to the terrorists. We find that shortly after the attacks, the 
employment-population ratios and hours worked of very young (ages 16 to 25) Muslim men 
fell. By 2004, most losses had begun to dissipate. The employment-population ratios and 
hours worked of older Muslim men experienced little deterioration. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The 9-11 terrorists attacks generated a significant amount of animosity towards Arabs 
and Muslims living in the United States. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 
reported a 64% increase in discrimination complaints by the end of 2002. In 2003 and 2004, 
complaints increased by 70% and 49%.
1 Further, CAIR reported civil rights violations increased, 
with 18 to 26 percent of the reported violations occurring in the workplace.
2 
  Survey data also indicates an increase in discrimination. A 2007 PEW research center 
survey of 1,050 Muslim adults living in the U. S. found that 53% of all respondents agreed that 
since the 9-11 attacks it had become more difficult to be an American Muslim. Interestingly and 
very important for our analysis, younger Muslims (ages 18-29) more frequently reported being 
the object of suspicion (32% in contrast to 22% of older Muslims). 
  The U.S. government’s policy and legal responses to the 9-11 attacks generated feelings 
of anxiety and isolation for Muslims.
3 The executive branch implemented a number of anti-
terrorism programs. These programs translated into a difficult legal environment for certain 
Arabs and Muslims. Some of the initiatives were targeted towards categories of non-citizens. 
Mass round-ups of predominantly Arab and Muslim immigrants started weeks after 9-11. Other 
initiatives include the special registration program (initiated in November 2002 and abolished in 
December 2003);
4 "voluntary" interviews (about 13,434 interviewees were placed in removal 
proceedings for visa violations); the Justice Department's efforts to involve local police in the 
enforcement of federal immigration law; and holding Muslim detainees without charge. Arab 
and Muslim organizations described these programs as detrimental to community relations. 
Estimates of the impact that 9-11 had on Muslim labor market outcomes have emerged. 
Dávila and Mora (2005) find that between 2000 and 2002 (2001 excluded), Arabs and Muslims 
experienced a significant decline in earnings as compared to non-Latino Whites (those who 
speak only English at home). Their interpretation is that the 9-11 attacks affected the labor 
market outcomes of demographic groups that most closely match the terrorists’ ethnicity. Their 
sample included men between the ages of 25 and 40 who worked at least twenty hours per week 
and for thirty-two weeks or more in the survey year. Their target group included men from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and the Middle-eastern Arab countries.
5  
Kaestner, Kaushal, and Reimers (2007) find that the 9-11 attacks were not associated  
 




with a reduction in the employment and hours worked of Arabs and Muslims. However, the 
attacks were associated with about a 14 to 16 percent decline in the real weekly earnings of 21 to 
54 year old Muslim and Arab men. Kaestner et al. find that changes in occupation and industry 
account for some of the decrease in wages. They infer that the distribution of Arab and Muslim 
men by occupation and industry changed after 9-11 and that these changes adversely affected 
earnings of Arab and Muslim men. Kaestner et al. also find that internal migration of Arabs and 
Muslims decreased after 9-11. This is suggestive of a decline in the returns to mobility. Finally, 
they show that over time, the adverse impact of 9-11 dissipated. 
  Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) estimate 9-11’s affect on the earnings of 18 to 39 year old 
male Latino immigrants who have, at most, completed a high school education. They estimate 
difference-in-differences models and find no effect on employment, but they do find a 4 to 7 
percent decrease in hours worked and a 3 to 6 percentage point drop in the employment of Latino 
immigrants relative to Latino natives.  
These three studies utilize a variety of outcomes, periods of observation, ages, labor force 
attachments, and different control groups. This paper attempts to unify these three studies and 
answer the following questions. Did the labor market outcomes worsen for Muslims (i.e. 
immigrants from Muslim-majority countries) after 9-11, particularly for Muslims whose 
demographic profiles closely fit those of the terrorists? Was the deterioration short-lived (i.e. did 
they dissipate overtime)? 
Using the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) micro data from 1999 to 
2004 and a difference-in-differences (DD) methodology, we estimate impacts for all men 
between 16 to 64 years of age and age sub-groups (e.g., 16 to 25). We estimate DD models for 
three outcomes: employment-population ratio, hours worked, and earnings. We estimate impacts 
using three target groups and three control groups. Finally, we perform several robustness 
checks. In particular, we incorrectly specify the dates of the attacks in the difference-in-
differences models.  
We find that 9-11 and the anti-terrorism measures were associated with a relative 
decrease in employment, hours worked, and the earnings of immigrants from Muslim-majority 
countries. The largest decreases were among the youngest immigrant men (ages 16 to 25) from 
the Middle East (excluding Israel), Iran and Afghanistan, whose demographic profiles are the 
closest to the terrorists. Most significant is the finding that even for the youngest men, the  
 








Our central method is difference-in-differences, where we compare the change in the 
employment-population ratio, usual hours worked per week, and real weekly earnings of a target 
group to that of a comparison group.
6  Thus, we attempt to remove the impact that labor supply, 
labor demand and institutional factors have on target-group outcomes.
7 
More formally, outcomes are described as follows: 
, u Muslim * Trend β Trend β ) Muslim * (State β
State β ) Muslim * (Quarter β   Quarter  β ) Muslim * (Z β Z β
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(1) 
where  ist Y  is the labor market outcome of person i in state s at time t. The term t After  is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the observation comes from any month after September 2001, and zero 
otherwise. The term ist X  denotes a vector of individual characteristics that include potential 
experience, education, race and ethnicity, marital status, length of stay in the US, citizenship 
status, and generation in the US. In our earnings equations,  ist X contains occupation and industry 
indicators.
8 
The term st Z  represents the state unemployment rate,  t Quarter  is the interview quarter 
(ranging from 1 to 4) to capture seasonality and  t Trend  is as a cubic function of time (starting 
from 1 for January 1999), capturing unmeasured, time-varying influences.
9 The notation State s 
represents dummy variables that capture differential effects of location. The coefficient 3   on the 
interaction of  t After  and Muslimist identifies the difference-in-differences effect of 9-11 on the 
labor market outcomes of Muslims.
10  
Most of the effects are allowed to differ by the Muslim status. This is done to allow for 
the fact that some factors like the business cycle, and citizenship status, might have affected the 
two groups differently over time. Two recent reports by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination  
 




Committee (Ibish and Stewart 2003) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR 
2002 to 2005) suggest that discrimination varied by location. However, other than using the 
state/region dummies and Muslim to “non-Muslim” population ratios as an index of their 
visibility, no control is used for this variation across locations.
11 
  The key to identifying the impact of the terrorists’ attacks on Muslim labor-market 
outcomes is the proper construction of target and comparison groups. Previous studies use a 
limited set of target and comparison groups. We demonstrate that there are additional 
considerations when constructing these groups. First, the impact of 9-11 on the labor-market 
outcomes of Muslims and Arabs varies by age. New job-market entrants might have experienced 
different outcomes than experienced workers. Given the terrorists’ profiles, younger 
Muslims/Arabs may be more vulnerable to discrimination.
12 Second, the labor market outcomes 
of Muslims might have been affected by the laws and programs created after 9-11 as well as by 
the animosity and fear that emerged after 9-11. To operationalize these ideas, we create several 
target groups consisting of either Muslim men or immigrant men from Muslim-majority 
countries. 
 
III.  Data and Results 
We use the 1999 to 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation 
Groups files. The micro data sample is restricted to men who at the time of the survey were 16 to 
64 years old and were not enrolled in school. The construction of the target and comparison 
groups and some salient features of the samples are described below. 
 
A. Target and Comparison Groups 
Religious affiliation is the appropriate information for categorizing whether an individual 
is Muslim, but the CPS does not contain this information. However, the CPS contains the 
reference person’s country of birth as well as their parents’ nativities, which makes it possible to 
identify 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants from most Muslim-majority countries. We use this 
nativity information to define whether an individual is Muslim. We think this is a good proxy for 
determining whether an individual is Muslim. Evidence suggests that people did not discriminate 
against Muslims with much accuracy after 9-11.
13  News reports and other studies find cases 
where non-Muslims with Muslim appearances experienced work place backlashes.
14  In many  
 




instances, it is very difficult to distinguish Arab Christians from Arab Muslims by name and 
appearance. 
Further, country of birth also links up with the US government’s special registration 
program. Most of the Muslim-majority countries (except Turkey and Malaysia) were on the 
Department of Justice’s “Special Registration” list.
15 In November 2002, the first in a series of 
call-in requirements was imposed on men from these countries. It required men from these 
countries to report and register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The CPS 
contains geographic information that allows us to identify 12 of the program’s 24 countries. Nine 
countries are combined in two regions: the “Rest of North Africa” and the “Rest of Middle East” 
which excludes Israel. Two countries, Somalia and Eritrea are mixed with the CPS’s “other 
African countries” category. Countries in this category were not included in the special 
registration program. Thus, we can not identify Muslims from Somalia and Eritrea.
16 
We construct three target groups (i.e., three groups of Muslims). Target Group C, the 
broadest group consists of 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants from all of the special registration 
countries identifiable in the CPS: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern 
Arab countries (Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan.
17 Turkey, 
Indonesia and Malaysia are Muslim-majority countries but were not listed under the special 
registration program. There has been relatively little evidence that the immigrants from these 
countries experienced intolerance after 9-11. India has the 2
nd largest Muslim population but it is 
not clear whether non-Muslim and non-Sikh Indians experienced discrimination.
18 So neither 
target nor comparison groups include immigrants from these countries. 
Immigrants from Bangladesh, Indonesia, and North Africa (except for Egypt and 
Morocco) do not fit as well as Arabs with the nativity and ethnic profiles of the 9-11 terrorists. 
Therefore, we create Target Group B, a sub-group that is closer to the terrorists in nativity and 
ethnicity. This group consists of 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants from Afghanistan, Middle 
Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Morocco – immigrants from these countries 
should be closer to the nativity and ethnic profiles of the terrorists. 
The Iraq and Afghanistan wars, longstanding unrest in Palestine, and the Madrid Train 
Bombings might have made Arabs and Muslims from these regions targets for discrimination. To 
assess this possibility, we construct the narrowest sub-group, Target Group A, which consists of  
 




only men from Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, and Afghanistan, the terrorists’ countries of 
origin. Finally, we limit the target samples to the 18 states in which 75 percent of Muslims live.
19 
We make this exclusion to keep the target groups’ geographic concentration similar. 
As the validity of the difference-in-differences approach largely depends on the 
comparison group’s quality, we constructed three comparison groups. In developing the 
comparison groups, we attempt to select individuals who should not be impacted by post 9-11 
intolerance but at the same time are similar to Muslims in terms of their observable 
characteristics. Ideally, unobserved factors contemporaneous to 9-11 should have the same effect 
on target and comparison group labor market outcomes. 
Comparison Group 1 consists of 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants from non-Muslim-
majority countries. To keep the target and comparison groups similar in characteristics, we 
exclude 1
st and 2
nd generation Mexican, Central American, and Caribbean immigrants.
20 Their 
observable characteristics such as education and U.S. legal status and possibly some unobserved 
characteristics are not very similar to immigrants in our target groups. To avoid additional 
contamination of the target and comparison groups, we excluded immigrants from Turkey, 
Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and the CPS’s “Other Africa” category, which contains 
Somalia and Eritrea.
21  
  Comparison Group 2 consists of all US-born men excluding 2
nd generation immigrants 
from Target Group C: Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria and Other Africa. As mentioned earlier, respondents from these countries are 
excluded from both the target and comparison groups to avoid possible contamination. 
Comparison Group 3 consists of all U.S. born non-Latino whites that are not in Target Group C. 
We exclude African Americans and Latinos from this group because some of their observable 
characteristics (e.g. education) are different from those of whites. Appendix I provides a 
summary description of the target and comparison groups. 
 
B.  Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix II reports descriptive statistics for the youngest (ages 16 to 25) Muslim men 
and non-Muslim immigrant men (Comparison Group 1).
22 The demographic characteristics of 
Comparison Groups 2 (all US born men) and 3 (US-born Non-Hispanic White men) are similar 
to those for group 1 and are not reported here.
23 There are two noticeable differences between the  
 




target and comparison groups, often irrespective of age. First, the target groups tend to have 
higher education (Bachelors degree and above) in contrast to all of the comparison groups. 
Second, the target groups are more concentrated in “Sales” occupations than the comparison 
group (21.2 to 25.0% versus 10.9%). Third, target group individuals are more concentrated in 
“Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants” industries than individuals in the comparison group. 
Table 1 uses the cell means in Appendix II to construct non-regression adjusted 
difference-in-differences estimators. The Table shows that relative to Comparison Group 1, the 
employment-population ratio of very young Middle Eastern, Iranian and Afghan men (Target 
Group A) fell by 16.6 percentage points by the end of December 2002. The loss in employment 
is largely due to an 18-point drop in the employment-population ratio of the target group. By the 
end of 2004, 9-11’s impact seems to have dissipated to only 2.5-percentage point drop, but this 
estimate has little statistical precision. We obtain a statistically significant yet smaller estimate 
for Target Group B (-0.119). For young men from all special registration countries (Target 
Group C), we obtain an even smaller estimated drop in employment, with little precision. 
Although the estimated gap by the end of 2004 indicates that the target group has a statistically 
significant advantage, it is only 1.0 percentage point.  
The Table shows similar results for hours worked and real weekly earnings: target group 
outcomes typically decline shortly after 9-11 and recover by 2004. We attribute the decline in 
statistical significance to the greater variation in earnings and hours that must be explained 
compared to the simple binary employment variable. 
In general, it is not clear from these basic estimates whether these adverse effects were 
caused by animosity towards Muslims, the laws/programs that followed 9-11, differences in 
labor supply, labor demand, and institutional characteristics of target and control groups. Our 
regression-adjusted difference-in-differences estimates attempt to account for these factors. 
 
C. Regression Results 
Table 2 reports the regression-adjusted difference-in-differences estimates ( 3  ) of target 
groups A, B, and C relative to Comparison Group 1. The upper panel shows the effects for 1999 
to 2002 and the lower panel reports the effects for 1999 to 2004, which enables us to demonstrate 
9-11’s immediate and short-term impacts. Each target group contains results for three age 
groups: 16 to 25, 16 to 29 and 16 to 64. Probit models were used to estimate the employment  
 




equations. The partial derivatives are reported. Their standard errors were estimated using the 
Delta method. Ordinary least squares is used to estimate the log weekly earnings and hours 
worked equations. For these log weekly earnings and hours worked equations, robust standard 
errors, clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses.
24  
In Table 2, the first row of the upper panel shows that shortly after 9-11, the employment 
gap among younger men between target and comparison groups widened. This gap narrows as 
one moves from only Middle Eastern, Iranian and Afghan men (Group A) to immigrants from all 
Special Registration countries (Group C). The employment gap among 16 to 25 year old men 
expanded by nearly 45.0 percentage points for Target Group A by 2002, much larger than the 
unadjusted estimate of 16.6 percentage points (Table 1). This short-term effect is 38 percentage 
points when Pakistani and African Arabs (Target Group B) are included and 29 percentage 
points when men from all other Special Registration countries (Target Group C) are added. All 
are measured with moderate precision.  
Although large, the timing of these estimates corresponds to the year in which the 
reported number of civil-rights violations against Arabs and Muslims increased dramatically. 
The fact that 16 to 25 year old men comprise a very small fraction of the entire sample 
potentially makes the value of our findings dubious. However, when the sample’s upper age limit 
is extended to 29, we still obtain a 17.6 percentage point decline in relative employment for the 
broad target group (the effects for the narrow target groups were large and negative but not 
measured with precision). When we expand the sample to men aged 16 to 64, we find no change 
in the employment of these target groups associated with 9-11. 
Table 2’s lower panel shows that by 2004 only very young men, particularly those from 
the Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan were still experiencing a relative decline in employment 
that is attributable to 9-11. The panel also reveals that there is no statistically significant effect of 
9-11 on the employment of 16 to 29 and 16 to 64 year old men by 2004. The simple inclusion of 
25 to 29 year old men leads to a large dampening in 9-11’s impact. 
Switching to hours worked, we find that immediately after 9-11, there was a relative 
decrease in hours worked for the youngest target group. This is consistent with the relative 
decrease in their employment-population ratio as we set hours worked to zero for men who are 
not employed. By 2002, the narrow target group’s hours worked diminished by 17 per week 
relative to Comparison Group 1. For the broad group, the relative decrease was about 11 hours.  
 




The decline in hours for the youngest Muslims persists through the end of 2004. The relative 
decrease was bigger for narrower groups (about 16 hours) than for the broad group (about 8 
hours). It is possible that the elasticity of demand for young Muslims’ labor increased after 9-11 
due to rising animosity, fear, or legal stringencies. We find few statistically significant changes 
in hours worked for older Muslim men. Similar to the employment-population ratio estimates, 
the terrorist attacks appear to have had little impact on the hours worked of older Muslim men. 
  Weekly earnings have no distinct patterns that can be easily summarized.  Shortly after 
9-11, the earnings of Muslims in the narrow group (Target Group A) fall, with the largest erosion 
among 16 to 64 year old men. By 2004, the earnings disadvantage had largely dissipated. As we 
move to the Between Group, the pattern of losses among 16 to 64 year old men Muslims 
continues, but now young Muslims have an imprecisely measured advantage in 2002, which 
expands in 2004. This finding is even stronger in Target Group C.  
  What explains the earnings results? The decrease in earnings among 16 to 64 year old 
Muslim men might have been caused by a rise in prejudice against or fear of Muslim men overall 
or by the increased anti-terrorism measures. Muslim men might have been forced to accept lower 
income from the same occupation or to switch from higher-income jobs to lower-income ones. 
Kaestner et al. (2007) find evidence that Arab and Muslim men were more likely to report 
switching from higher to lower-income occupations in the post-9-11 months. The puzzle lies 
with our estimates for 16 to 25 and 16 to 29 year old Muslim men. Our earnings models exclude 
the unemployed and those out of the labor force. Thus, we suspect that our DD estimates are 
biased due to nonrandom selection of lower-paid Muslims in to unemployment and departures 
from the labor force. Their exclusion raises the group’s post-9-11 average earnings. The next 
section utilizes quantile regressions to explore this possibility. 
 
IV.   Robustness of Results 
Our findings that the employment of very young Muslim men deteriorated after 9-11 can 
be questioned on several grounds. First, during the post-9-11 years, the relative decline in the 
employment-population ratios and hours worked of young Muslims was accompanied by a 
relative increase in their average earnings (conditional on employment) for Target Group A in 
2004, and Target Groups B and C in both 2002 and 2004. Second, for the narrow group of young 
Muslims, the number of observations is small. Third, the validity of our comparison groups can  
 




always be questioned. Fourth, the post-9-11 drop in the employment-population ratio of young 
Muslims might have been driven by a significant net emigration of non-citizen working Muslims 
who had to leave the US due to the anti-terrorism programs (e.g., deportation of certain types of 
non-citizens).  
We address the first critique by estimating DD quantile regressions to show what appears 
to be a relative increase in the earnings of young Muslims can be attributed to employment loss 
by men concentrated in the lower tail of the earnings distribution. To address the additional 
critiques, we use pseudo-intervention dates in the difference-in-differences models. We explore 
the possibility whether increased net emigration was driving the results, and whether our results 
are sensitive to the use of additional comparison groups. 
 
Findings from Quantile Regressions 
  It is important to note that the earnings equations in Table 2 were estimated only for 
employed men. If job loss for younger Muslims after 9-11 was concentrated in the lower tail of 
their earnings distribution, average earnings conditional on working are biased upward. If this 
form of selection is large enough, it could generate an increase in the target group’s average 
wage that exceeds changes in the control group’s average wage, thus explaining our estimates in 
Table 2. To assess the possibility of this type of bias, we estimate our difference-in-differences 
models using quantile regressions at the 25
th, median, 75
th and 90
th percentiles of the earnings 
distribution. An individual’s earnings are set equal to zero if they are not employed. Relative to 
the control group, if a larger portion of low-wage young Muslims left employment after 9-11, we 
should observe our anticipated Muslim disadvantage at the distribution’s lower quantiles. 
Table 3 reports the quantile regression estimates for all special registration countries 
(Target Group C), compared to other immigrants. The difference-in-differences effects are 




th percentiles. These patterns support our basic hypothesis 
that a form of selection occurred among young Muslims, but not the full sample of 16 to 64 year 
old Muslim men. The estimated median coefficient of –0.003 in the upper panel shows that for 
the youngest Muslims, median earnings did not change relative to non-Muslims. However, a 50 
percent relative decrease is found at the 25
th percentile. By 2004, the disadvantage vanishes and 
becomes imprecisely measured at the 25
th percentile for 16 to 25 and 16 to 29 year olds. The 
middle panel reports that Muslims aged 16 to 29 had their median earnings rise by almost 14  
 




percent by 2002, compared to an imprecisely measured decline of 29 percent at the 25
th 
percentile. For 16 to 64 year old Muslim men, except for the 90
th percentile, their earnings 
decline at all quantiles. 
We obtain our hypothesized results for Middle Eastern, Iranian and Afghans (Target 
Group A). The relative earnings of younger as well as older Muslim men fell at lower quantiles 
by 2004.
25 This drop in earnings at the lower quantiles was accompanied with unchanged median 
earnings, which indicates that less-skilled and therefore low-earning young Muslims bore the 
brunt of the job losses, pushing their post 9-11 average earnings conditional on employment 
upward. 
 
Findings from using Different Intervention Dates 
  As an identification check, we incorrectly specify the timing of the attacks. To do this, 
we estimate our difference-in-differences models for two sub-periods. The first uses data from 
January 1998 to August 2001 and the second uses data from September 2002 to December 
2004).
26 For the pre-9-11 sub-period, we set the Post 9-11 dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
observation corresponds to a date after August 2000. For the post-9-11 sub-period, the dummy 
variable equals 1 if the data corresponds to a month after September 2003.  
  For the full set of observations that run from January 1998 to December 2004, we also 
use a “rolling” date strategy.  Here we set the attack date at a particular quarter and estimate the 
difference-in-differences model. We move the date forward by one quarter and re-estimate the 
model. The models are estimated for Target Groups A, B and C and comparison group 1. 
  Table 4 shows that for the January 1998 through August 2001 sub-period, with August 
2000 as the intervention date, the difference-in-differences effects on the employment-population 
ratio, log hourly earnings, and weekly hours worked are often close to zero and are never 
statistically significant, even for the youngest men. Estimates for the post 9-11 sub-period, 
September 2002 through December 2004 with September 2003 as an intervention date, which are 
not shown here, reveal that there was an increase in the relative employment and hours worked 
of younger men from the Middle East, Iran and Afghanistan. However, this is consistent with our 
earlier finding that the impact of 9-11 on these young men began to dissipate between 2003 and 
2004. In other words, this second set of months is not independent of 9-11’s effects.
27 
  Our “rolling” date strategy estimates thirteen (only the quarters from March 2001 to  
 




March 2003 are shown in Table 5 and Appendices III and IV) difference-in-differences models 
where each model corresponds to an intervention date between June 2000 and June 2003. All of 
the estimates are regression adjusted and use data from 1999 through 2004. Choosing this wide 
range of dates pinpoints the narrow window when the outcome’s (e.g., employment-population 
ratio) relative change occurred. The difference-in-differences estimates shown in Table 5 suggest 
that the relative decline in the employment-population ratio of the youngest Muslims occurred 
between September 2001 and December 2001.  For each target group, the relative decrease in 
employment is the largest in the year after 9-11 and dissipates as the intervention date moves 
farther from September 2001.
28  
  Consistent with the relative drop in employment, Table 5 also shows that hours worked 
decreased by 8 to 16 percent for the youngest group and the effects worsen as one moves from 
the broad to the narrow group. We find a similar pattern for the 16-to-29 year olds (Appendix 
III).  However, only a 10 percentage-point decrease in the broad target group’s employment-
population ratio is found when the longer time-window is considered. For 16 to 64 year old men 
(Appendix IV), we do not find a significant drop in employment at any “pseudo” intervention 
date. The above results confirm our earlier conclusions that employment deteriorated for the 
youngest members of the target group and the effects were short-lived, and older Muslim men 
were not heavily impacted by 9-11.  
  The earnings regressions using the rolling intervention dates yield results consistent 
with the 1999 to 2004 estimates in Table 2.
29  From June, 2001 to March, 2003, the difference-
in-differences estimates are positive. Young Muslims in each target group experience a relative 
increase in their earnings. The estimates reflect the impact of Muslim job losses that are 
concentrated at the lower tail of the earnings distribution. They persist well after the actual date 
of the attacks. 
 
 Did Muslim Net Emigration from the US Explain their Labor Market Outcomes Deterioration? 
After 9-11, there is some evidence of increased net emigration of both target and 
comparison group individuals. We estimated the population of the two immigrant groups from 
the CPS-MORG files. We find that the number of immigrants from both the Special Registration 
countries and other countries was stable over this period. In fact, both groups experienced slight 
population declines from 2003 and 2004. For the Special Registration countries, the drop was  
 




approximately 65,000 and for the comparison-group countries the estimated decline was near 
986,000. Even though the emigration numbers are different between the two groups, these 
decreases are not significant and occurred only in 2004. Furthermore, the decline in population 
for the two groups is proportional. Therefore, net emigration may not be a force driving Muslim 
labor market outcomes unless two things occurred: mainly non-citizens emigrated and a 
significant number of the outgoing non-citizen Muslims was employed in the US. 
  After 2001, the ratio of noncitizens-to-citizens decreased steadily until 2003 for the target 
group. The drop in the proportion of non-citizens is consistent with deportations and a significant 
fall in non-immigrant US-visa issuance after 2001, particularly for Special Registration 
countries. This change in the citizenship composition of the target group could have contributed 
to the relative decline. To check whether non-citizen emigration had any effect, we re-estimated 
the difference-in-differences models but restrict the Target Group C and Comparison Group 1 
samples to US-citizens. We find that the estimates increase only slightly. If net emigration 
occurred mostly for employed non-citizen Muslims, our estimates are biased upward. However, 
the opposite scenario (e.g., increased net emigration of non-employed Muslims after 9/11) seems 
more plausible in which case our estimates are biased downward. 
 
Using US-Native Men as Comparison Groups 
  As mentioned earlier, native-born men are not as good a comparison group as “non-
Muslim” immigrants because the target groups differ from natives in terms of language 
proficiency. To assess whether this is true, we construct two additional comparison groups: 
Group 2 (US-born men other than members in target groups) and Group 3 (US-born non-Latino 
White Men other than members in target groups). The same regression models are estimated 
with these comparison groups.
30 The estimates using the US-born men as comparison groups are 
similar to those using immigrants from non-Muslim countries. However, they are often not 
statistically significant. These estimates indicate that by 2002, employment dropped by about 20 
percentage points (marginally significant at 10% level) for the youngest (age 16-25) immigrants 
from all special registration countries (Target Group C). For Arab, Iranian, Afghan and Pakistani 
men, this decrease is about 23 percentage points (significant at 10% level). For very young 
Middle Eastern Arabs, Iranians and Afghans, a 24 percentage-point relative drop in employment 
was not statistically significant but a 13-hour relative decrease in their work by 2004 is  
 




statistically significant at 1% level. For 16 to 64 year old men, there were approximately 16, 15 
and 10 percentage-point drops in earnings for Target groups A, B and C respectively relative to 
the US-born men. Use of Comparison Group 3, US-born non-Latino Whites yields qualitatively 
similar results (Available upon request).  
 
V.   Summary and Conclusions 
This paper provides a comprehensive set of estimates of 9-11 and the associated anti-
terrorism measures’ impacts on the labor market outcomes of Muslim men. Using a natural 
experiment framework, we find that labor market outcomes worsened for men with nativity 
profiles closer to the terrorists. Employment losses are greatest and longest in duration for very 
young (ages 16 to 25) Muslim men. Many of the estimated losses dissipate by the end of 2004, 
with weekly hours as the exception. Our results are similar to previous studies that include older 
individuals in their samples. When we include older individuals, the estimated losses are small 
and short-lived. 
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis of an emergence in discrimination against 
minorities that more or less fit the Muslim stereotype after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. However, 
the labor market’s legal environment became relatively rigid for first-generation immigrants at 
least for a short period after 9-11. Because of these simultaneous changes, it is difficult to 
disentangle how much of the effects on labor market outcomes were caused by discrimination 
and how much by anti-terrorism legislation. 
Two pieces of evidence are suggestive of a growth in discrimination against immigrant 
men. First, Muslims with age and nativity profiles closer to the terrorists’ experienced larger 
declines in their employment. Second, the decline in employment and earnings of Muslims 
associated with 9-11 began to dissipate after 2002, just when some of the salient anti-terrorism 
programs and laws were initiated. Furthermore, the fear of discrimination might also have 
discouraged some minority workers from labor market participation. 
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Table 1: Non-regression Adjusted Difference in Difference Estimates for 1
st and 2
nd Generation Immigrant Men Age 16 to 25 
Target Groups: Immigrants from Muslim-Majority Countries. Comparison Group 1: Other Immigrants 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable 
Target Group A (Narrow Group) 
(Mid Eastern, Iranians, Afghan) 
Target Group B (In-Between Group) 
(Group A, Pakistanis, African Arabs) 
Target Group C (Broad Group) 
(All Special Registration Countries) 
Employment      
Jan. 99 to Sept. 01  - -  - 














Hours Worked      
Jan. 99 to Sept. 01  - -  - 














Real Weekly Earnings      
Jan. 99 to Sept. 01  - -  - 














Notes:  Entries are difference in difference estimators based on the cell means in Appendix II. Target and Control group definitions are reported in 
Appendix I. A “**” denotes significance at 1% level. A “*” denotes significance at the 5% level, and “+” indicates significance at the 10% level.  
 




Table 2: Difference-in-differences Effects of 9/11 on Labor Market Outcomes  
of Immigrants form Muslim-Majority Countries Relative to Other Immigrants Living in the US 
 
Target A (Narrow) 
(Mid Eastern, Iranians, Afghan)   
Target B (In-Between Group) 
(Group A, Pakistanis, African Arabs)   
Target C, (Broad Group) 
(All Special Registration countries) 
  Age 16-25  Age 16-29  Age 16-64    Age 16-25  Age 16-29  Age 16-64    Age 16-25  Age 16-29  Age 16-64 
Employed=1  -0. 448  -0. 200  -0. 030    -0. 379*  -0. 165  -0.010    -0. 292+  -0. 176+  -0.004 
  (0. 242)  (0.153)  (0.044)    (0. 163)  (0.102)  (0.038)    (0. 142)  (0. 091)  (0.034) 
Observations  4142 7795  39374    4219  7907  40091    4321  8024  40535 
Weekly Hours   -17.032 -7.912 0.097    -19.216+ -6.913 -0.468    -10.778*  -5.112 -1.474 
  (10.997) (7.548) (2.051)   (10.316)  (7.639) (2.233)    (4.949)  (3.525) (1.648) 
Observations  4073  7575  38300     4152  7748  38990     4198  7850  39421 
Log weekly earnings  -0.176 -0.104  -0.196**   0.052  0.107 -0.142*    0.144  0.235+  -0.096* 














Observations  2997 5826  27468    3036  5933  27927    3064  6003  28250 
Employed = 1  -0. 306+  0. 044  -0. 013     -0. 149  0. 064  -0.027     -0. 167  -0.090  -0. 020 
  (0. 161)  (0. 087)  (0. 034)    (0.112)  (0.068)  (0.028)    (0. 101)  (0. 060)  (0.025) 
Observations  6136 11443  58250    6241  11592  59243    6314  11752  40709 
Weekly Hours   -15.865** -3.575  -1.07  -16.383*  -5.124 -1.783+    -7.659*  -2.537 -1.315 
  (5.699) (4.412)  (1.085)   (6.161)  (5.082) (0.905)    (2.874)  (2.749) (0.947) 
Observations  6037 11128  56714    6148  11355  57672    6216  11501  58296 
Log weekly earnings  0.024 0.069  -0.060+    0.231  0.166  -0.090+   0.257+  0.214**  -0.022 














Observations  4396 8468  40359    4457  8615  40996    4497  8713  41468 
Notes: For earnings and hours worked models, robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses.  
Statistical Significance: + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. For employment-population ratio, the effects are difference-in-differences 
of probabilities predicted by probit models. The difference-in-differences effects were predicted for each individual separately. Standard errors shown  
in parentheses were calculated using the delta method. Explanatory variables were Muslim, 9-11 dummy variable, race and ethnicity, state, potential experience,  
potential experience-squared, educational attainment,  citizenship, length of time in US, generation, and a cubic time trend. all explanatory variables were interacted with 












Table-3: Difference-in-differences effects on the Weekly Earnings of 
Immigrants from all Special Registration Countries Compared to Other Immigrants (Target Group C) 
Effects at shown at the 25
th, 50
th, 75
th and the 90
th Quantiles  
  1999 to 2002  1999 to 2004 
Quantiles:    0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.25 0.50 0.75  0.90 
Age 16-25       
Muslim*After 9-11  -0.501+ -0.003  0.038  0.218+ -0.011  -0.078  0.071  0.175+ 
  (0.261) (0.173) (0.120) (0.114) (0.183) (0.127) (0.088)  (0.094) 
Observations  3521 3521 3521 3521 5185 5185 5185  5185 
Age 16-29         
Muslim*After 9-11  -0.293 0.142+  0.349** 0.034  -0.211 0.096+  0.316**  0.147 
  (0.196) (0.079) (0.111) (0.136) (0.146) (0.055) (0.078)  (0.101) 
Observations  6687 6687 6687 6687 9737 9737 9737  9737 
Age 16-64       
Muslim*After 9-11  -0.107 -0.097* -0.022  0.033  -0.054  -0.017  -0.015  0.013 
  (0.073) (0.048) (0.056) (0.060) (0.061) (0.042) (0.042)  (0.048) 
Observations  30651 30651 30651 30651 45149 45149 45149  45149 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical Significance: + means significant at 10%;  * means significant at 5%;  ** means significant at 1%.  
For Unemployed and Out-of-Labor force individuals, log-earnings was assigned a value of zero. The effects of divisions, unemployment rates, state per-capita 
incomes, occupations and educational attainment were allowed to vary by the target group. Target Group C consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants from 
all but two Special Registration countries. Comparison Group 1 consists of 1st and 2nd generation immigrants excluding those from countries in Target Group C, 
Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and “Other-Africa.  
 




Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates from Using the Months  
Between January-1998 and August 2001 with August 2000 as the Intervention Date 
Effects for Target Groups A, B and C compared to Other Immigrants 





















Employment  -0.074 0.01 -0.024    -0.051 0.042 -0.011    0.046 0.064 -0.014 
  (0.081) (0.042) (0.025)    (0.082) (0.033) (0.027)    (0.094) (0.040) (0.027) 
Observations  3872 7279  36660    3836 7190  36282    3775 7056  35675 
 
Log weekly 
earnings  -0.097 -0.113 0.045    0.031 -0.049 0.037    -0.096 -0.115 0.052 
  (0.080) (0.079) (0.029)    (0.088) (0.055) (0.030)    (0.073) (0.093) (0.038) 
Observations  2783 2783  25639    2760 5419  25360    2729 5337  24963 
 
Weekly Hours 
Worked  -3.242 1.131 -1.102    -1.747 2.908 -1.053    0.329 1.492 -1.716 
























Observations  3793 7104  35593     3757 7017  35226     3698 6889  34652 
Notes:  Numbers show the difference-in-differences effects from the models with a pseudo 9-11 date. We took the monthly data from January 1998 through  
August 2001 and used September 1999 as the month after which the “Post 9-11” dummy was assigned a value of one. Models were run for target groups A, B  
and C and comparison group 1. Robust Standard errors clustered by repeated observations are in parentheses.  Statistical Significance:  + Significant at 10%;  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% . Effects on Earnings and Hours worked were given by OLS regressions and effects on Employment  were from  








Table 5: Relative Changes in the Labor Market Outcomes of Muslim Men Age 16 to 25 after Various Dates 
(Regression Adjusted Difference-in-differences effects and Standard Errors are shown) 
   Mid-Eastern & Afghan men (Group A)  Mid-Eastern, Afghan & African men (Group B)  Men from All SR Countries (Group C) 
Dates  EPOP  Hours Worked  Log Earnings EPOP  Hours Worked  Log Earnings  EPOP  Hours Worked Log Earnings 
Mar-01 0.041  0.650  -0.102  0.083  2.563  -0.131  0.030  1.932  -0.081 
  (0.101) (4.647)  (0.176) (0.090)  (3.935) (0.142)  (0.080)  (3.732) (0.157) 
Jun-01 -0.130  -8.242  0.117  -0.048  -5.113  0.008  -0.109  -5.368  0.094 
  (0.114) (5.367)  (0.195) (0.090)  (4.174) (0.160)  (0.080)  (3.909) (0.174) 
Sep-01 -0.267**  -15.744*  0.187  -0.130  -7.362+  0.257  -0.160+  -8.051**  0.257 
  (0.121) (5.639)  (0.237) (0.100)  (4.449) (0.171)  (0.090)  (4.059) (0.170) 
Dec-01 -0.263*  -10.401**  0.328  -0.156+  -6.724+  0.285+  -0.197**  -8.815**  0.211 
  (0.099) (4.730)  (0.201) (0.080)  (3.829) (0.150)  (0.080)  (3.604) (0.151) 
Mar-02 -0.134  -8.629+  0.351+  -0.050  -3.720 0.334**  -0.104  -5.364  0.292** 
  (0.108) (4.931)  (0.189) (0.080)  (3.648) (0.138)  (0.070)  (3.404) (0.137) 
Jun-02 -0.137  -6.698  0.339+  -0.045  -1.990 0.386*  -0.116+  -5.097+  0.290** 
  (0.095) (4.185)  (0.184) (0.070)  (3.069) (0.134)  (0.060)  (2.861) (0.129) 
Sep-02 -0.122  -5.922  0.377**  -0.021  -0.983 0.401*  -0.069  -2.942  0.301** 
  (0.090) (4.027)  (0.171) (0.070)  (2.917) (0.128)  (0.060)  (2.763) (0.124) 
Dec-02 0.000  -1.725  0.497*  0.052  1.517  0.359*  -0.001  -0.802  0.274** 
  (0.088) (3.881)  (0.158) (0.070)  (2.861) (0.124)  (0.060)  (2.683) (0.119) 
Mar-03 -0.037  -3.430  0.368**  0.034  0.683  0.277**  0.001  -0.965  0.222** 
  (0.085) (3.747)  (0.147) (0.070)  (2.813) (0.108)  (0.060)  (2.657) (0.104) 
Notes: Each regression uses 6,149 observations. Robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. A “+” denotes significance at 10%. A “*” 
denotes significance at 5%, and “**” denotes significance at 1%. Explanatory variables are potential experience, experience-squared, state-unemployment rates, cubic-time trend, 
state-level ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim populations and dummies for Muslim, After-9/11, races, states,  education, citizenship status, length of stay and generation in the US. 
Explanatory variables were interacted with the Muslim dummy variable. Special Registration countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan. Comparison Group consists of 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants excluding those from the Special 
Registration countries, Mexico Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and “Other-Africa”.  
 




Appendix I: Target and Comparison Group Definitions 
 




Target Group C (the Broad Group): 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants from most Countries under 
Special Registration Program. (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab 
countries Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan.). 
 
Target Group B (the In-between Group): 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants from Afghanistan, 
Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Morocco 
 
Target Group A (the Narrow Group): 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants from Middle Eastern 




Comparison Group 1: 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants excluding Target group C, Mexico, 
Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and “Other-
Africa”. 
 
Comparison Group 2: All US-born men excluding Target group C. 
 
Comparison Group 3: All US-born non-Hispanic Whites excluding target group C. 
  
 




Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics for 1
st and 2
nd Generation Immigrant Men Age 16 to 25 living in the US 
Target Groups: Immigrants from Muslim-Majority Countries. Comparison Group 1: Other Immigrants 
Variable 
Target Group A 
(Mid Eastern Arabs, 
Iranians, Afghan) 
Target Group. B 
(All Arabs, Iranians, 
Afghan, South Asians) 
Target Group. A 
(Men from  
all Special Registration Countries) 
Comparison Group 1 
(Immigrants from 
Non-Muslim-majority Countries) 
Employment        
Jan. 99 to Sept. 01  69.1  62.2**  63.2**  75.86 
Observations 68  127  163  2,784 
Oct. 01 to Dec. 02  51.3**  49.1**  56.0**  74.7 
Observations 37  55  75  1,253 
Oct. 01 to Dec. 04  64.6**  62.5**  62.4**  74.02 
Observations 113  160  197  3,168 
Hours Worked per Week        
Jan. 99 to Sept. 01  28.8  25.6*  26.3+  29.36647 
Observations 67  124  160  2726 
Oct. 01 to Dec. 02 20.4*  19.0** 21.5**  28.72358 
Observations 36  54  73  1230 
Oct. 01 to Dec. 04 24.9*  20.9** 23.6**  28.30831 
Observations 111  157  194  3117 
Real Weekly Earnings        
Jan. 99 to Sept. 01  244.8  246.9*  241.0  247.3703 
Observations 52  81  100  2029 
Oct. 01 to Dec. 02 222.1  251.1**  245.2503  251.6574 
Observations 21  31  40  895 
Oct. 01 to Dec. 04 214.6  230.8**  268.7**  240.6799 
Observations 71  103  124  2244 
Age  21.941 21.943  22.088  21.879 
Spouse Present = 1  8.333** 8.755*  8.413*  13.364 
Citizen = 1  64.583** 59.677  55.449  58.294 
Education Categories        
Below High school = 1 17.361*  17.05*  15.87*  27.915 
High school Diploma = 1  38.194  36.405  36.137  39.586 
Some College = 1  20.834  22.12+  22.563*  18.516 
Bachelors' Degree = 1  12.847  15.207*  16.252*  10.657 
Masters' or Above = 1  10.764*  9.217*  9.178*  3.326 
Generation in USA         
 




1st Generation = 1  52.778  57.834  61.951+  53.093* 
2nd Generation =1  47.222  42.166  38.049+  46.907* 
3rd Generation =1         
Length of Stay in USA        
0 to 5 years =1  17.709  21.199  23.71+  17.573* 
5 to 10 years = 1  15.625  17.973  21.224  16.64* 
10+ years = 1  66.667  60.83  55.067**  65.788* 
Major Occupation Groups        
Managers and Administrators 4.238  4.928  6.265  3.985 
Professional 10.169  11.884  12.048  9.556 
Associate Prof. & technical  3.39  3.478  3.132  2.04 
Clerical and Secretarial  12.288  12.754  11.807  9.771** 
Craft and related  17.373  15.942  17.109  21.272+ 
Personal and Protective  4.661  5.217  4.578+  4.414 
Sales 25*  22.898  21.205+  10.94 
Plant and Machine operatives  20.3*  20.29  21.2**  30.434** 
Other 2.5*  2.609  2.651  7.588 
Major Industry Groups        
Agriculture & Fishing  0.847  0.58  0.723  1.718 
Energy & Water  0  0  0.241  0.453 
Manufacturing 8.1+  7.826  7.711**  12.276* 
Construction 5.1*  4.927  4.819*  12.419* 
Distribution, Hotels & Restaurants 46.6*  44.348  43.855*  32.844* 
Transport & Communication  5.509  7.247  7.711  5.345** 
Banking, Finance & Insurance 13.56  16.522  16.627  15.45 
Public admin, Education & Health  8.475  7.826  7.229  8.053 
Other Services  11.864  10.724  11.084  11.441 
Total Observations  280  423  511  9527 
Notes:  All variables except real weekly earning, hours worked per week and age are categorical. Means are shown for variables for each target and comparison group.  Whenever 
difference between a target group’s outcome is statistical significant, the target group’s outcome is marked with asterisk(s): ** means significant at 1% level, * means significant at 5% 
level, + means significant at 10% level.  
 




Appendix III: Relative Changes in the Labor Market Outcomes of Muslim Men Age 16 to 29 after Various Dates 
(Regression Adjusted Difference-in-differences effects and Standard Errors are shown) 
  Mid-Eastern & Afghan Men (Group A)  Mid-Eastern, Afghan & African Men (Group B)  Men from All SR Countries (Group C) 
Dates  EPOP  Hours Worked  Log Earnings  EPOP  Hours Worked  Log Earnings  EPOP  Hours Worked  Log Earnings 
Mar-01 0.069  3.802  0.046  0.024  2.876  -0.009  -0.044  0.489  0.070 
  (0.081) (4.027)  (0.154)  (0.060) (2.921)  (0.117)  (0.054)  (2.702)  (0.117) 
Jun-01 0.006  -0.004  0.121  -0.038  -0.384  0.072  -0.106+ -2.722  0.157 
  (0.088) (4.446)  (0.176)  (0.061) (3.028)  (0.123)  (0.056)  (2.784)  (0.122) 
Sep-01 -0.046  -4.064  -0.053  -0.062 -2.719  0.081  -0.096  -3.741  0.194 
  (0.099) (4.796)  (0.172)  (0.070) (3.277)  (0.128)  (0.063)  (2.967)  (0.122) 
Dec-01 -0.052  -1.947  -0.034  -0.084 -3.677  0.094  -0.081  -3.563  0.116 
  (0.087) (4.066)  (0.164)  (0.062) (3.017)  (0.113)  (0.057)  (2.714)  (0.105) 
Mar-02 -0.046  -2.868  0.015  -0.059  -3.195  0.136  -0.060  -3.016  0.164+ 
  (0.080) (3.658)  (0.147)  (0.056) (2.648)  (0.099)  (0.051)  (2.391)  (0.092) 
Jun-02 -0.016  -0.511  0.016  -0.027  -0.657  0.140  -0.043  -1.658  0.117 
  (0.074) (3.300)  (0.132)  (0.053) (2.398)  (0.094)  (0.047)  (2.138)  (0.084) 
Sep-02 -0.027  -0.874  0.072  -0.016  0.106  0.162+  -0.018  -0.225  0.123 
  (0.068) (3.109)  (0.124)  (0.049) (2.238)  (0.092)  (0.044)  (2.001)  (0.082) 
Dec-02 0.039  0.641  0.134  0.017  0.537  0.148  0.003  -0.363  0.089 
  (0.066) (3.046)  (0.123)  (0.049) (2.257)  (0.095)  (0.043)  (1.987)  (0.086) 
Mar-03 0.036  1.016  0.056  0.022  0.631  0.080  0.005  -0.364  0.053 
  (0.063) (2.945)  (0.125)  (0.048) (2.297)  (0.096)  (0.043)  (2.018)  (0.088) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. A “+” denotes significance at 10%. A “*” denotes significance at 5%, and “**” denotes significance 
at 1%. Explanatory variables are potential experience, experience-squared, state-unemployment rates, cubic-time trend, state-level ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim populations and dummies for 
Muslim, After-9/11, races, states, education, citizenship status, length of stay and generation in the US. Explanatory variables were interacted with the Muslim dummy variable. Special 
Registration countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and Pakistan. Comparison Group consists of 1
st 
and 2








Appendix IV: Relative Changes in the Labor Market Outcomes of Muslim Men Age 16 to 64 after Various Dates 
(Regression Adjusted Difference-in-differences effects and Standard Errors are shown) 
  Mid-Eastern & Afghan Men (Group A)  Mid-Eastern, Afghan & African men (Group B)  Men from All SR Countries (Group C) 
Dates  EPOP  Hours Worked  Log Earnings  EPOP  Hours Worked  Log Earnings EPOP  Hours Worked Log Earnings 
Mar-01 -0.004  0.242  0.011  -0.01  -0.114  -0.005  -0.027  -0.929  0.014 
  (0.029)  (1.615) (0.064) (0.023)  (1.278) (0.053)  (0.021)  (1.168)  (0.049) 
Jun-01  -0.026  -0.226 0.026 -0.034  -0.665 0.012  -0.041+  -1.253  0.021 
  (0.033)  (1.814) (0.070) (0.027)  (1.458) (0.058)  (0.024)  (1.302)  (0.053) 
Sep-01 -0.004  -1.057  -0.113  -0.02  -1.375 -0.07  -0.016  -1.284  -0.047 
  (0.035)  (1.867) (0.073) (0.028)  (1.503) (0.060)  (0.025)  (1.344)  (0.056) 
Dec-01 -0.032  -1.376  -0.089  -0.050**  -2.718** -0.07  -0.036+  -2.233+  -0.082+ 
  (0.029)  (1.575) (0.066) (0.024)  (1.316) (0.052)  (0.021)  (1.172)  (0.048) 
Mar-02 0.007  0.403  -0.045  -0.009  -0.584 -0.031  -0.007  -0.654  -0.031 
  (0.026)  (1.398) (0.062) (0.021)  (1.160) (0.048)  (0.019)  (1.032)  (0.043) 
Jun-02 0.008  0.313  -0.052  -0.005  -0.165 -0.045  -0.009  -0.503  -0.054 
  (0.024)  (1.295) (0.054) (0.020)  (1.064) (0.044)  (0.018)  (0.942)  (0.039) 
Sep-02 0.014  0.397  -0.043  -0.002  -0.132 -0.015  -0.001  -0.26 -0.039 
  (0.023)  (1.260) (0.052) (0.019)  (1.031) (0.041)  (0.017)  (0.919)  (0.037) 
Dec-02  0.02  0.597 -0.019 0.007  0.146 -0.001  0.004  -0.052  -0.024 
  (0.022)  (1.196) (0.050) (0.018)  (1.000) (0.041)  (0.016)  (0.893)  (0.037) 
Mar-03 0.034  1.389  -0.007  0.014  0.533  0.003  0.014  0.535  -0.015 
  (0.021)  (1.123) (0.057) (0.017)  (0.952) (0.045)  (0.016)  (0.862)  (0.039) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by repeated observations are shown in parentheses. A “+” denotes significance at 10%. A “*” denotes significance at 5%, and “**” denotes 
significance at 1%. Explanatory variables are potential experience, experience-squared, state-unemployment rates, cubic-time trend, state-level ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim 
populations and dummies for Muslim, After-9/11, races, states, education, citizenship status, length of stay and generation in the US. Explanatory variables were interacted with the 
Muslim dummy variable. Special Registration countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Middle Eastern Arab countries, Iran, Libya, Morocco, North Africa and 
Pakistan. Comparison Group consists of 1
st and 2
nd generation immigrants excluding those from the Special Registration countries, Mexico Central America, the Caribbean, Turkey, 
Malaysia, India, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and “Other-Africa”.  
 





                                                 
1 The increase in reported incidences may exaggerate the increase in actual incidents for two reasons. First, reporting 
might have increased because CAIR’s online reporting system became more familiar to Muslims after 9/11. Second, 
CAIR counts all hate-crime and discrimination reports, verified and not verified. 
 
2 According to US Equal Opportunity Commission (Washington, DC 20507) between 9/11/2001 and 12/11/2002, 
705 charges were filed under Title VII with Process Type Z. - CAIR Annual Report 2002. For additional 
background, see for example, Baker et. Al (2003), Braakman (2007a, 2007b) Human Rights Watch (2002), Leonard 
(2003), Lindkvist (2002), Moore (2002), Shryock (2002) Suleiman (1999) and U.S. Census Bureau (2003).  
 
3 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (www.lchr.org); September 2003 Report. “Assessing the New Normal: 
Liberty and Security of the Post-September 11 United States”. Also see, Hate Crime Report (2001). 
 
4 On November 6, 2002, a Federal Register Notice was issued. “Call-In” Requirements for Special Registration for 
Males form specific countries. It was a system that would let the US government keep track of non-immigrants that 
come to the U.S. Any affected individual failing to follow these requirements was subject to lose his immigration 
status. Approximately 35 million non-immigrants were required to register with immigration authorities either at a 
port of entry or a designated immigration office in accordance with the special registration procedures. These special 
procedures also require additional in-person interviews at an immigration office and notifications to immigration 
authorities of changes of address, employment, or school. Non-immigrants who were to follow these special 
procedures would also have to use specially designated ports when they left USA and report in person to an 
immigration officer at the port on their departure date. Non-immigrant adult males from the following countries 
were called in for the program: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, 
Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait. 
 
5 Using quantile earnings regressions Dávila and Mora show that the difference in earnings between Muslims and 
non-Muslims widened at all earnings deciles during 2002 relative to deciles in 2000. Their results from a Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce decomposition reveal that the unexplained earning gaps increased in 2002 for Middle Eastern 
men. Unexpectedly, they find that earnings improved for African Arab men compared to non-Hispanic Whites. 
Their study also indicates that the decrease in earnings for Muslims was bigger in states with larger Muslim 
populations (i.e. in states where Muslims are more noticeable). They find that the earnings gap between Middle 
Eastern Arab men and non-Hispanic White men widened by about 35 percentage points and for men from 
Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan the gap increased by about 29 percentage points in 2002. 
 
6 Kaestner et al. (2007) regress “earnings” for employed individuals. For their “hours-worked” regressions, they 
include all individuals setting hours equal to zero for men who were not employed. We do the same in the OLS 
regressions but for the quantile earning regressions, we include all men assigning log of earnings equal to zero if not 
employed. This is done to avoid the sample selection bias occurring in the mean regression. 
 
7
 The recession that began in March 2001 is potentially one such confounding factor. Estimation of the pre- and 
post-9/11 changes in outcome using only the target-group (i.e. Muslims) sample may generate a negative coefficient 
simply because of the business-cycle downturn.  
 
8 To control for industry of work, 9 major industry dummy variables were used. To control for occupations we 
constructed ten major occupation groups. However, we use “percentage of group members working in the respective 
occupation” to control for occupational variations instead of using occupation dummies. Exclusion of this variable 
does not significantly affect the difference in differences effect. 
 
9 We follow the specifications of Kaestner et al. (2004) here. We find coefficients of the time-trend variables always 
negligible and statistically insignificant. Models with month dummy variables yielded similar results. 
 
10 In the case of probit, the interaction effect is estimated by taking the average of difference-in-differences of the 
predicted probabilities. 
 
11 Kaestner et al. allowed the effect of September 11
th to differ according to an index of hate crime/discrimination 
against Arabs and Muslims. They used three measures of September 11th related hate crime or discrimination:  
 




                                                                                                                                                             
number of hate crime/discrimination incidents reported in a state; number of hate crime/discrimination incidents per 
Arab population in a state; and number of hate crime/discrimination incidents per state population. While the first 
two capture the risk of discrimination Arabs and Muslims face in a state, the third is an indicator of the prevalence 
of prejudice among the non-Arab population. Prior to October 2001, value of hate-crime index was assumed to be 
zero in all states. They estimated the results using all three indices and found the effects of all of them to be 
statistically insignificant. Due to the insignificant effects and the limited nature of the data, we do not include the 
indices in the analyses. 
 
12 There has been no study on whether the 1
st generation immigrants were affected more than the 2
nd-generation 
immigrants. Anti-terrorism laws and programs targeted primarily those 1
st generation immigrants who are not US 
citizens, especially those who are not residing or working legally in the US. A fraction of the 1
st generation 
immigrants in the CPS datasets should be illegal immigrants. Demographic research suggests that at least a fraction 
of the illegal immigrants are in the CPS since the number of immigrants enumerated by the survey (and by the 
decennial Census, upon which the CPS weights are based) exceeds estimates of the number of the foreign-born 
legally present in the U.S. 
 
13 Allen and Nielsen (2002) find that after 9/11, the single most predominant factor in determining who was to be a 
victim of an attack or infringement was their visual identity as a Muslim. This was found to be the case across 
reports from all 15 EU member states. Also, there were seven reported cases of murders of Sikh men between 
September 2001 and February 2005. Sikhism is a religion, which in no way is affiliated to Islam. All of the cases 
appear to be hate-crimes. Details can be found here: 
http://www.sikhcoalition.org/ListReports.asp 
 
14 Detroit Arab American Study-2003, University of Michigan; ICPSR Study No.: 4413; CAIR Annual Reports on 
Civil Rights Violations. 
 
15 Non-immigrant adult males from the following countries were called in for the special registration program: Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, 
Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and 
Kuwait. The CPS-MORG files do not separately identify Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and Eritrea. But 
they identify immigrants from North Africa, which consists of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and 
Western Sahara. 
 
16 The “Rest of Africa” which includes Somalia and Eritrea is dropped from the data. This is done to make sure that 
none of the comparison groups contains immigrants from the special registration program. 
 
17 Algeria, Libya and Tunisia cannot be identified separately but they are geographically included in North Africa. 
Most North African countries excluding Sudan were under the special registration list. Inclusion of North Africa 
might have created some contamination in Target group C. For Target group B, we dropped North Africa. 
  
18 The 2005 CAIR report shows that there were over 1500 alleged incidents of civil-rights violations against 
Muslims. 198 of them were reported as employment discrimination. Most of the victims in CAIR (2002 and 2005) 
and ADC (2003) reports had Arab, Afghanistan or Pakistani nativity. In its 2003 report, ADC (American-Arab Anti-
discrimination Committee) mentions 800 cases and summarizes 101 cases of employment discrimination. None of 
the summary cases of employment discrimination were about Indian natives. 
  
19 Kaestner et al. included 20 states in their study. We excluded two of those states to keep number of younger 
Muslims reasonably large in each state. 
 
20  Immigrants from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are excluded because their educational 
achievement and language proficiency is not similar to other immigrants. Besides, a recent study (Orrenius and 
Zavodni, 2005) found that the relatively new immigrants from Mexico experienced a small drop in earnings after 9-
11. 
 
21 Turkey and Malaysia were not listed under the special registration program but are Muslim-Majority country. 
None of the excluded African countries were enlisted for special registration but they have significant Muslim 
population and they are close to immigrants from Egypt and Morocco in terms of nativity and ethnicity.  
 




                                                                                                                                                             
 
22 Descriptive statistics for men age 16 to 64 are available upon request for all ages, around 85% of the observations 
in the target groups are 1
st generation immigrants whereas only 64% of the members of comparison group 1 are 1
st 
generation immigrants. On the other hand, in the youngest age group (ages 16 to 25) the distributions of 1
st and 2
nd 
generation are similar between target groups and comparison group 1 (around 60% are 1
st generation immigrants). 
Special registration and other similar legal requirements ensuing from 9/11 were targeted towards the first 
generation immigrants. If legal rigidities have had negative impacts on some group of workers (conditioning for 




23 They are available upon request. 
 
24 For the employment regressions, the difference-in-differences of employment-ratio was predicted for each 
observation separately and the mean of all the difference-in-differences is reported for each age-range under each 
target group in table 3. Standard errors were estimated for each prediction and the mean of those standard errors is 
shown in parentheses. 
  
25 The quantile regression results for the in-between group and the narrow group are available from the authors on 
request. 
 
26 Notice that the second set of months should start sufficiently long after 9-11, i.e. after the effect of the event 
dissipates. 
 
27 The results for the post-9/11 time window, i.e. the second set of months are available from the authors on request.  
28 We used nine intervention dates for the 1999-2002 time window. September 2001 and January 2002 interventions 
yield the largest relative drops in the employment of the youngest members of the target groups. The drops are 
around 30 to 35 percentage points and are statistically significant. If is worth mentioning here that for the narrow 
target group, the unadjusted regressions show nearly 14 to 18 percentage-point relative drops in employment after 9-
11 for this shorter time-window. We used a shorter time-window, 1999 through 2002. Intervention dates close to 9-
11 yield bigger employment effects for 16 to 25 year old Muslims 
 
29 Results available from authors on request. 
 
30 Regression estimates from using US-born men as comparison groups are available from the author on request. In 
regressions that included comparison groups 2 and 3, we drop citizenship status and length of stay variables to avoid 
multicollinearity problem. 
 